OK, so yesterday I posted two lists that generated considerable discussion both on the blog and on twitter, dealing with what I thought were the best and the worst of Brewers president and GM Doug Melvin. When a guy is on the job for over a decade, he’s going to build up quite a track record, both positive and negative. With the Brewers currently floundering in last place in the NL Central, I think now is a fair time to ask: how good a job has Melvin done at the helm of the Brewers?

Steve Garczynski:

Considering the state of the Milwaukee Brewers when Doug Melvin took over, he’s done a really good job.

Or…

Considering the amount of talent that the Milwaukee Brewers were able to graduate through their farm system in the 2000’s, two playoff appearances is really disappointing.

The Brewers were clearly in a bad place when Melvin took over. Miller Park opened in 2001 and the fans were promised a competitive team by that time. Dean Taylor made significant strides rebuilding the farm system, but was overmatched when it came to making moves at the major league level that could move the team forward. Melvin wasn’t afraid to flip assets and moved Richie Sexson, adding a core of talent that started to make the team competitive in the middle of the decade. Things were starting to look up, and combined with the talent that had been assembled in the minors, Doug Melvin looked like the guy who would lead the Brewers out of the dark ages.

Melvin hired Ned Yost as manager to lead the young team and that was a decent hire for two reasons, 1) Ned stubbornly stuck with struggling young players, and 2) Ned was antagonistic with the media and that put all of the heat squarely on his shoulders. He was definitely a players’ manager, and the organization was going to stick with the young guys to put a winner on the field.

It didn’t take long for the front office to get a little jumpy and try to put a winner on the field as soon as possible. Where Melvin flipped Sexson for some young guys like Chris Capuano and Jorge De La Rosa, he had an asset in Carlos Lee that he wasn’t willing to part with earlier and then moved for low-ceiling vets like Francisco Cordero, Laynce Nix and centerpiece Kevin Mench. Then of course, the infamous Jeff Suppan deal happened in the offseason.

Things were still looking up though. Prince Fielder, Rickie Weeks and JJ Hardy were getting significant time in the majors and looked poised breakout in the next year or two, and Ryan Braun and Corey Hart were making their case in the minors to move up to the big squad. This pre-arbitration group didn’t have the legs to make the playoffs in 2007, so the team put pressure on themselves to make 2008 THE YEAR.

To make sure 2008 wasn’t a disappointment, Melvin made the historic trade for CC Sabathia, and the Brewers rode the big lefty into a Wild Card spot where a gassed squad that lost Yovani Gallardo early in the season and Ben Sheets late couldn’t hang with the Phillies. But the playoff drought was over, so that’s all that really mattered, right? The Brewers used to be awful and now they made the playoffs.

Those bad decisions early really piled up and 2009-2011 should have been the years the Brewers were a perennial playoff team. Instead the rotation was bare with the exception of Gallardo. Milwaukee wasn’t even a .500 team in 2009 or 2010 when the talent the farm system had produced was seasoned, but still young and cheap. What was once a promising start soon turned into a wasted opportunity.

Ryan Topp:

That’s an interesting way of answering the question, and I really can’t disagree with too much of that history. I think it’s worth emphasizing just how down the team was by the end of the Sal Bando era in terms of overall talent in the system, and I really think Taylor did about as good a job as anyone could have in that time. He made bold moves at the major league level, and most blew up in his face, but he really wasn’t dealing away a bunch of superstars. He was trying to get what he could with what he had and I don’t know if there was a true path to success for him here.

I agree with you on Yost and the general praise for his early years at the helm. As we’ve discussed, those first years of the rebuilding effort are in some ways the most free a GM will ever be to just find any value wherever it exists and try and leverage it into more where possible. When a team isn’t worried about having to field a competitive roster, things are easier and Melvin handled it relatively well.

The “original sin” of Melvin, I think, took place in about a six month period at the end of the 2006 season. In that time, he:

1) Traded Lee and Cruz for a handful of spare parts

2) Traded away Jorge De La Rosa for Tony Graffanino

3) Traded away Doug Davis and Dana Eveland for Johnny Estrada and Claudio Vargas

4) Signed Jeff Suppan

That seriously unfortunate series of moves was obviously a reaction to the Brewers rotation falling apart over the first half of that year and it really hurt their long-term outlook. Instead of using the assets he had to bolster the starting pitching, he actively cut into the depth and left the team heavily reliant on an already breaking down ace, a bunch of number four and five  starters and Yovani Gallardo and Manny Parra as the only real future, pitching wise.

At that point the die was basically cast and they were going to have to settle in for a future of either selling off major assets to rent an impact arm or two or just not having the depth of starting pitching to make it work. So they go for it all in 2008, but have no bullets left in the chamber for 2009 and 2010. The GM’s contract was coming up in 2012, so 2011 became another “all in” year where the team cashed in lots of controllable young talent for some rentals. Now, the Brewers are left sitting here without the pitching needed to contend yet again and at a certain point I think one just throws up their arms and says: when is this team going to actually produce or trade for young pitchers who can stick around and produce more than a one year window to contend?

Steve Garczynski:

Was the Greinke trade worth the one year window? That probably isn’t fair since he was on the team for two seasons, but again, some poor roster decisions undercut his second season in Milwaukee.

When is this team going to produce young pitching? I don’t know, when is the farm system going to produce young talent? Braun and Gallardo were drafted early in Melvin’s tenure. Since then, there hasn’t been a lot of talent to end up contributing at the major league level. Is there anyone drafted and developed besides Jonathan Lucroy? That’s bad news for a small market team like Milwaukee and calls into question a good portion of Melvin’s time here.

Overall, I think my view on Melvin is mixed. He set the organization in the right direction at the major league level. He believed in the talent that the farm system was producing and stuck with young players through the growing pains. He’s also been savvy about adding cheap veteran talent and rounding out the squad.

But the farm system has fallen into disarray under his watch. It’s hard to produce impact talent, but Milwaukee doesn’t even have guys with the potential to be first division players, and the guys who did have those profiles like Brett Lawrie and Alcides Escobar were traded away for short-term pitching solutions. It’s as if the mantra of building through the draft and grooming young talent was set aside once the Major League team was competitive. The organization was run like you could do one or the other, but you couldn’t build a competitive team while also stockpiling talented and cost effective players in the minors. That’s a major failure for a GM that’s trying to field a playoff contender year in and year out in a small market.

I’d also like to take a moment and point my long, boney finger at Pittsburgh and Kansas City fans, and tell them to be careful what you wish for. You may want that splashy move right now that might get you into the playoffs, but it can do a lot more damage down the road.

Ryan Topp:

I was about to jump all over you for leaving out Lawrie, Escobar and also Lorenzo Cain and Jake Odorizzi, so I’m glad you came back and mentioned them… Add Lucroy to that group and while it’s hardly the 2000 to 2005 draft bumper crop, it’s also not bad for a team that stopped drafting consistently in the top 10 after 2005.

The problem with the drafting has been more recent, as I mentioned in the “10 worst” post, but even then I’m not entirely sold that the future is completely bleak. Guys like Jimmy Nelson, Taylor Jungmann, Tyler Thornburg and Johnny Hellweg all seem very likely to pitch in the big leagues, though none profile as the sorts of guys you would like pitching in game one, two or maybe even three of a playoff series at the moment. Mike Fiers and Hiram Burgos have struggled early, but a spot at the back of a successful big league rotation isn’t out of the question for either.

Also, the team does have an extremely interesting group of young hitters who have played this year at class A Wisconsin, headlined by last year’s first rounders. There are others as well, and some hitters that are closer who could potentially play meaningful roles in the big leagues on the not too distant future. They’re not devoid of talent, they just lack obvious stars at the moment.

So the key at the moment seems to be sorting through who is likely to pan out and who isn’t, supplementing it through the draft and the international market and hope for some luck. It also really wouldn’t hurt if they were able to pull off a couple of trades of some of their aging talent and bringing back some sort of young starting pitching with control years left if they are unable to get back into contention this year at some point. The group of Braun, Segura, Gomez and Lucroy looks a lot better to build around than it did two months ago, and it is strong up the middle of the diamond. There are teams in worse shape than the Brewers, they just need to get a little more creative and aggressive in how they deal with starting pitching.

Nashville Sounds: (13-32), 11.0 GB

LHP Zach Kroenke:  (W, 2-6) 7.0 IP, 4 H, 2 ER, 2 BB, 7 K, 1 HR — 5.23 ERA
RHP Johnnie Lowe:  1.0 IP, 1 H, 0 ER, 0 BB, 2 K — 5.30 ERA
RHP Rob Wooten:  1.0 IP, 1 H, 0 ER, 0 BB, 2 K — 3.09 ERA

C Blake Lalli:  3-5, 2 HR (4), 4 RBI, 2 R, K — .306 AVG
1B Hunter Morris:  2-4, 2B, HR (8), 2 RBI, R — .250 AVG
CF Josh Prince:  2-4, 2B, HR (2), RBI, BB, 3 R, K — .239 AVG

Huntsville Stars: (20-26), 8.0 GB

RHP Jimmy Nelson:  (L, 5-3) 7.0 IP, 4 H, 2 ER, 1 BB, 7 K, 1 HR — 2.98 ERA
RHP Santo Manzanillo:  1.0 IP, 0 H, 0 ER, 1 BB, 1 K — 5.21 ERA

1B Jason Rogers:  1-4, 2B, K — .289 AVG
CF Rene Tosoni:  1-3, BB, CS (2) — .247 AVG

Brevard County Manatees: (25-21), 2.0 GB

LHP Jed Bradley:  (L, 3-2) 2.2 IP, 8 H, 8 ER, 2 BB, 2 K, 1 HR — 5.45 ERA
RHP Chad Pierce:  4.1 IP, 1 H, 0 ER, 1 BB, 6 K — 2.36 ERA
RHP Andre Lamontagne:  1.0 IP, 3 H, 1 R (0 ER), 1 BB, 2 K — 4.66 ERA

C Cameron Garfield:  1-4, 3B, RBI, K — .247 AVG
CF Mitch Haniger:  1-4, R, K — .250 AVG
LF T.J. Mittelstaedt:  0-2, RBI, 2 BB, 2 R, K — .233 AVG

Wisconsin Timber Rattlers: (21-21), 7.5 GB

RHP Jorge Lopez:  (W, 1-3) 6.0 IP, 0 H, 0 ER, 5 BB, 7 K — 8.88 ERA
RHP Ryan Gibbard:  2.0 IP, 4 H, 4 ER, 4 BB, 4 K, 1 HR — 3.15 ERA
RHP Rodolfo Fernandez:  (S, 2) 1.0 IP, 0 H, 0 ER, 0 BB, 0 K — 4.50 ERA

LF Victor Roache:  2-4, 2B, HR (5), 2 RBI, 2 R, 2 K — .223 AVG
1B Adam Giacalone:  1-2, 2 RBI, BB, R — .250 AVG
RF Michael Reed:  1-5, 3B, RBI, 2 R, 2 K — .307 AVG

Prospect of the Day:  RHP Jorge Lopez (Class-A Wisconsin)

Lots of hype surrounded right-hander Jorge Lopez when the Brewers selected him in the second round of the 2011 MLB Draft. He was a projectable 6-foot-4 prep pitcher with a fastball that touched in the mid-90s with a hammer curve. Unfortunately, the development has been painstakingly slow thus far. He spent much of last season with the Dominican Summer League and had an 11.64 ERA heading into his start on Thursday evening.

I’ve been told that Jorge Lopez still pitches like a high school prospect. When he’s on, he possesses the arsenal to shut down opposing batters, but when he’s struggling, he’s missing in the middle of the plate and getting hammered. On Thursday, Lopez brought his good stuff to the mound and threw six scoreless (and hitless) innings. He walked five batters, but that’s almost irrelevant given his past struggles. It was wonderful to see the right-hander sustain success for an entire start.

Plenty of projection remains for Lopez. He still could develop into a mid-rotation starter for the Brewers. It’s just very unlikely that he reaches that ceiling due to his current lack of refinement, and it’s also difficult to see that projection because that potential ceiling is years away.

10) CC Sabathia trade

OK, put down the pitchforks and torches and let me explain why this wasn’t Doug Melvin’s finest moment. This isn’t about CC, he was obviously amazing for the Brewers, and a key component of the franchise’s first playoff run in over a quarter century. It’s also not about the players that were traded turning into stars, as clearly Matt LaPorta, Michael Brantley, Rob Bryson, and Zach Jackson didn’t become the kind of stars that you regret trading. The problem is more philosophical. The fact of the matter is that Melvin used a big chunk of his most valuable minor league trade pieces to rent a player for three month’s time. Make no mistake, those players traded away had considerable trade value, even if they didn’t turn out as was expected. The mistake isn’t so much trading them away, but rather putting all of those assets towards one, and one only, playoff run. The team did happen to scrape in, but they paid the price for this (and other moves) over the next two seasons as they found no way to build a playoff caliber rotation despite having a fine young offense to work with. Context is also important here, because if the Brewers had more pitching coming up through the farm system at the time maybe this makes more sense. They didn’t, and thus long-term needs of the franchise were only temporarily met, and then the club was once again left searching for pitching.

9) Hiring Ken Macha as manager.

One of the hardest things any general manager has to do is to hire a field manager and obviously Melvin hasn’t hit a home run with any of his three managerial hires. Still, at least Ned Yost accomplished the successful “breaking-in” of those 2000-05 draftees and Ron Roenicke has a career 197-172 record. The Ken Macha hire was basically a disaster from start to finish. Yes, it’s true he wasn’t given much in the way of a starting rotation to work with, and he was tactically more in line with my thinking than either of the other two, but his inability to run a functional clubhouse ultimately kept him from being given the chance with a good rotation in 2011. What makes the hire worse was that he came to Milwaukee with a reputation for being hard to get along with, but that didn’t seem to matter. At the end of the day, 2009 and 2010 represent tremendously blown opportunities for contention and Ken Macha was at the helm for those two debacles.

8) Signing David Riske.

This is what happens so often when teams invest money in relievers, especially those without much in the way of velocity and already on the wrong side of 30. The Brewers gave Riske 12 million over three years and were rewarded with 66 2/3 innings of 5.40 ERA (77 ERA+) pitching. This was also a very poorly timed move, in that the team was committing to paying him four-plus million a year through the key 2009 and 2010 seasons, but more on that later.  Fortunately, Melvin seems to have somewhat learned from this mistake since then, having given out no more than a two year contract to any reliever since then.

7) Allowing the first rounds of the 2009 and 2011 drafts to happen.

Neither list has included much about the draft to this point, other than Melvin choosing to retain Jack Z, and that is completely by design. General managers don’t run the drafts of their teams in baseball the way that they do in other sports. That is left to scouting directors who spend all year evaluating amateur baseball talent through their network of scouts and cross-checkers. Still, the responsibility for these decisions ultimately falls to the general manager, and Melvin has never been shy about taking responsibility for his involvement with first-round picks. It really appears as though the Brewers, in a perpetual quest for starting pitching, took three college starters with limited upside but who could theoretically help the team sooner rather than later. 2009 first-rounder Eric Arnett has been a bust basically since the word go. 2011 15th overall pick Jed Bradley has struggled mightily and has scouts questioning if the Brewers will ever get anything out of him. Only 2011 12th overall pick Taylor Jungmann appears to be on a clear path to the big leagues, but he has struggled to miss bats and seems destined more for the back end than the front end of a big league rotation at this point. Getting that little out of three first round picks, especially when two of them were in the top 15 of a loaded 2011 draft, isn’t something that a team in a small TV market can do and sustain success for long.

6) Trading Doug Davis for Johnny Estrada.

Yes, Doug Davis was frustrating to watch at times. He walked too many batters and didn’t strike many guys out. He took forever to get the ball to the plate and every start seemed like a trip to the dentist. He also ate a ton of innings from 2007 to 2009 (542 IP) and did so with solidly above average run prevention (4.22 ERA and a 109 ERA+). He did so with the Diamondbacks, and for the cost of 22 million dollars. In return, the Brewers primarily got back Johnny Estrada, whose one year of occasional power, quick and numerous outs and painfully inept defense couldn’t end fast enough. The team also got back Claudio Vargas and Greg Aquino, but any value gained there was basically wiped out by giving up Dana Eveland, who did post one useful year for the A’s when he still would have been under Brewers’ control. Perhaps the worst thing about this deal is it then left a hole in the Brewers’ rotation for an inning eater….but more on that later.

5) Trading Brett Lawrie to get Shaun Marcum.

Yes, Marcum was a key piece in the 2011 playoff run and Lawrie has been hurt and intermittently awful with only flashes of  brilliance. This one, like the Sabathia trade, really comes down to a philosophical difference on the best way to run a small market franchise. Trading away high-upside, talented prospects for limited control of players is a dangerous game, and not one that financially strapped teams cannot afford to play very often. Even if the Brewers were dissatisfied with Lawrie’s attitude and wanted to trade him, targeting an often hurt pitcher with modest fastball velocity hardly seems like the best possible use of a consensus top 50 prospect. When panning this deal in the past the common response has often been “well, without making this trade they don’t get Greinke.” Even if that is true, that speaks more to the failure over the years on Melvin’s part to acquire enough pitching through other means than it justifies a course of action like this. If we want to be most charitable to Melvin, we could perhaps say that the sin wasn’t making the trade so much as it was being in the position to feel the need to make the trade. Of course, Melvin had already been at the helm at that point for eight seasons, so the position they were in was mostly his doing to begin with.

4) Bill Hall‘s contract extension.

In 2005 and 2006 combined, Bill Hall hit .280/.344/.525 over the course of over 1,154 plate appearances and showed enough defensive utility that giving him a four year deal for roughly 25 million seemed like a slam dunk. Unfortunately, Hall would never again hit like anything close to that again, and the contract would become something that had to be worked around from that time forward. There were rumors (most notably the now infamous ESPN “Player X” column in 2010) that Hall became a party animal after getting paid, something he denied. If that was the case, then it’s hard to really fault Melvin for making the deal, since no one can know for sure what another person is going to do in a situation like that. If not, then the failure is primarily a scouting one, and scouting is more of an art than a science and mistakes are inevitable. Either way, it hurt the team and Melvin did it, so it belongs on this list.

3) Ryan Braun‘s second contract extension.

Again, with the pitchforks and torches. This one gets really tricky and could still work out reasonably well for the Brewers if Braun can sustain something like his current level of performance for the next five or six seasons. Like the Greinke for Segura trade being on the good moves list, this one involves a good deal of projection since it doesn’t even begin for almost three more years. The main issue is that the Brewers simply didn’t have to do this deal. They already had Braun under a fantastically team friendly deal through his age 31 season. Getting the years that comprise most players’ “prime” years at such a massive discount was a huge coup, but then they went out and paid an additional 100 million to get his age 32-36 seasons. To be sure, some players are highly productive through those years, but others see significant decline. Many start dealing with chronic injuries that keep them off the field or hamper their ability to be the player they once were. The best thing that can be said about this deal is the Brewers didn’t have to pay anything like the premium that other teams paid for their starts, but if Braun can’t justify the contract on its own merits, how it compares to other deals won’t matter.

2) The Carlos Lee trade with Texas.

As much as acquiring Lee goes to Melvin’s credit, the way in which he handled Lee’s departure was flawed on a number of levels. First off, Melvin failed to deal him after the successful 2005 campaign, when he could have conceivably gotten more for a full year than for two months of Lee. He also then made the mistake of including Nelson Cruz in the deal, just because Texas didn’t want to be left empty handed when Lee walked. While it did take Cruz a couple more years (and a trip through waivers) to produce, and he probably never gets that long of a leash in Milwaukee, it still was an odd decision to include him just to get back what they did. Kevin Mench, Laynce Nix and Francisco Cordero all plugged holes for the team, and allowed the team to claim that they weren’t “giving up” on the season, but they simply were not very valuable. Cordero was the best of the bunch, but he was merely a solid relief pitcher made out to be more because he had the Proven Closer Seal of Approval. Perhaps most glaringly, Melvin did not acquire any starting pitching in this deal. We can’t know what sorts of guys were offered for Lee, but considering the mediocre return that did come back, taking a chance on an upside arm or two wouldn’t have kept them from achieving anything they did achieve and could have possibly led to much more.

1) Signing Jeff Suppan.

Was there really any other way to go with #1 on this list? Suppan was really the wrong player, at the wrong time on the wrong contract and it was pretty apparent from the get go that it wasn’t a good idea.  Suppan was an aging pitcher who relied heavily on the outstanding Cardinals’ defense to turn his ground balls into outs. His stuff was showing steady decline and it was never realistic to think that he would hold his value through the contract. Despite that, the Brewers decided to backload the deal and pay him almost 2/3 of the contract’s 42 million price tag over the last two years when he predictably became a sub replacement level pitcher. The timing couldn’t have been worse for the club, as 2009 and 2010 became prime years for the young offensive core put together by Jack Z through the draft. Each of those years, the Brewers began the season with essentially 20 million-plus  in “dead money” between the Suppan, Hall and Riske contracts that could have been used on pitching but instead went largely to waste. This was an epic miscalculation and it played the biggest role in costing the team two prime years of contention.

Moves that just missed the top 10: Signing Wes Helms, trading Jorge De La Rosa for Tony Grafanino, signing Eric Gagne, the Derrick Turnbow extension, bringing Trevor Hoffman for a second season in 2010.

THREE MONTHS BY PERALTA

Now that we’re nearly two months into the season, we can slice Peralta’s big league performance into thirds. Alongside Peralta’s exceptional replacement outing to close the 2012 season, his April and May performances show a startling trend of strike outs, walks, and homers:

In some regard, Peralta’s April to May walk trends show an encouraging trend, but alongside his home runs and overall performance, his walks almost suggest a pitcher working too aggressively, rather than controlling the strike zone and limiting the damage. Meanwhile, Peralta’s strike outs dropped, and his home runs increased (although, given Miller Park, his home run rate isn’t nearly as troubling as his strike out rate).

In both April and May, Peralta’s decrease in walks and strike outs turned the righty into a “contact” pitcher, where more than 75% of his batters faced knocked the ball into play.

One of the likeable traits for Peralta is that he recovered from a rough early 2012 in AAA, and he improved to the point of performing as one of the National League’s best short-term replacement pitchers. That type of improvement shows a tenacious pitcher, or one that can weather adversity and regain his approach. So, I’m certainly not throwing in the towel on Peralta, but given his disappearing strike out rate and Batted-Ball-In-Play approach, one can certainly ask, “what’s going on with Peralta?”

PERALTA’S RELEASE POINTS

Since I had yesterday afternoon off, I was ready to sit back and enjoy a Brewers broadcast. Unfortunately, the early game performance made the definition of “enjoyment” rather subjective, so I investigated my question about Peralta. The righty flashed electric stuff at times in 2012, and worked effectively with basically two fastballs and a slider. What changed?

Notably, the first area of change is Peralta’s release point. In 2012, Peralta released the ball closer to the arm side of the mound, and arguably lower and further away from his own body. In 2013, Peralta’s release point is higher, and he’s either releasing the ball closer to his body, or changing his position to the first base side of the rubber. Either way, his release point is effectively higher and closer to his body in 2013.

You might ask, “what does Peralta’s release point matter?” Well, release points and arm angles (and, in some cases, even where a pitcher sets up on the rubber) can influence how a pitcher is able to spin the ball, break his pitches, and get the optimal movement and angle against the batter. Similarly, as arm angles and release points change, so too does a batter’s view of the ball. Depending on the way batters approach a pitcher, a shifting arm angle could cause that pitcher to lose deception on his motion. Similarly, if a batter can pick up the ball easier, well, that gives the batter one more moment to consider that offering.

Peralta’s slider has arguably suffered the most from his mechanical shift. Alongside his higher-and-closer release point, Peralta’s 2013 slider is neither breaking away from righties nor dropping as much as his 2012 slider. This type of shift in break and movement is significant because it changes his slider from a pitch that actively offsets his primary and secondary fastballs, to a pitch that, well, is just a slower pitch that drops from his fastball. While it’s good that Peralta is continually maintaining the velocity differential between his fastball and slider, it’s not good that the pitch isn’t breaking or dropping as much.

Alongside a shifted release point, Peralta’s less active slider takes away one of his secondary weapons. This arguably changes Peralta’s ability to use his fastball effectively, as well. Specifically, Peralta is currently locating his slider for strikes 11% less frequently than in 2012, which changes the way that he needs to use his fastball (notably, he is throwing both of his fastballs in the zone much more frequently). This especially affects Peralta’s secondary, or sinking/moving fastball, which he is throwing much more frequently in 2013: Peralta is throwing that pitch for strikes more frequently, getting more whiffs, and also getting more batted balls in play.

A less potent slider that doesn’t land in the zone as much, accompanied by a different release point with a potentially more visible ball, arguably takes away two different weapons from Peralta: (1) Peralta cannot deceive batters with the movement or location of his slider, and (2) Peralta cannot threaten batters with both his fastball and slider. Effectively, Peralta’s fastball becomes a sitting duck. If his slider doesn’t land for strikes, his fastball must hang around the zone, and if the visibility of those pitches changes in favor of the batters, the batters will have an easier time dealing with both pitches.

A SIGN OF HOPE?

At the end of April, Peralta threw two consecutive quality starts. Notably, his arm angle was closer to its 2012 position than his higher 2013 point.

I am not sure what this shift in mechanics suggests. In one regard, this shows that Peralta has not completely lost his release point, and could potentially leverage his mechanics and repeat them to effectively locate, break, and move his pitches. On the other hand, this also shows the oft-fleeting nature of pitching mechanics. As upset as fans might be about Peralta’s performance, we should also appreciate just how momentary and difficult good pitching mechanics can be; although Peralta hasn’t completely lost it, he also hasn’t limited the damage when he doesn’t have his best release point. This time, the details are easy to see on the field and in the box score.

RESOURCES:
Baseball-Reference. Sports Reference, LLC. 2000-2013.
TexasLeaguers. Trip Somers, 2009-2013.

Movement and release point charts from TexasLeaguers, Trip Somers, 2009-2013.

10) Signing Mike Cameron.

By the opening of the 2008 season, center field had become something of a revolving door for the Brewers. Players like Scott Podsednik and Brady Clark had some success there in Melvin’s tenure, but they also faded in their second go-rounds and the team hadn’t had a true offensive and defensive weapon in many years. When Melvin signed veteran Mike Cameron to a one year deal with an option for a second year, it was something of a risk since he would begin the year suspended for 25 games for violating the new prohibition on amphetamines. Once he did find his way to the field, he was every bit the two-way weapon that Melvin envisioned. In the two seasons, Cameron accrued 8.1 total Fangraphs wins above replacement for the total pricetag of 16.25 million, or just barely two million per win. The Brewers also didn’t have to give up a draft pick or make a long-term commitment and the move was made just in time for the Brewers 2008 playoff run. All in all, a very nice pickup.

9) Trading JJ Hardy for Carlos Gomez.

It’s telling of how much things can change over time, because before the 2012 season this move probably could have gone on the “worst moves” list.  Gomez did play good defense his first two and one half seasons in Milwaukee, but it wasn’t until the second half of 2012 that Gomez turned his considerable offensive tools into above average production. One could perhaps make the case that Melvin should have sought starting pitching instead of hitting when moving Hardy, but it’s hard to quibble too much considering what Gomez has done and since we will never know what Melvin was offered in the way of pitching when he put Hardy on the market in late 2009.

8) The Ben Sheets extension.

This one may raise a few eyebrows, but the reality is that even though Sheets missed some starts over the life of the contract, he was excellent enough when on the mound to still earn his money and then some. From 2005 to 2009, Ben Sheets made 94 starts, posted a 3.45 ERA (126 ERA+), struck out 521 and walked only 120. That was worth an even 14 fangraphs wins and it came at the cost of a little over 40 million, or just under three million per win. Sheets wasn’t the durable, inning-eating ace that Brewers fans wanted, but compare his career with that of the Cardinals Chris Carpenter. Carpenter frequently missed time, multiple whole seasons in fact, but the Cardinals put enough around him to make what he could give very valuable. The fact that Sheets didn’t have the teams around him until the very end to take advantage of his contributions doesn’t lessen what they were. Sheets also gave everything that he had to give, quite literally, to trying to get the 2008 Brewers into the playoffs. Not every player would take it upon themselves to make that sort of sacrifice at the expense of their future earnings.

7) Trading for Carlos Lee.

The 2004 Brewers were obviously missing a right-handed power bat, and after that year Melvin went out and traded for a pretty good one when they shipped Podsednik and Luis Vizcaino to the White Sox for Lee. El Caballo wasn’t much of a defender and, with his contract expiring at the end of 2006 was pretty clearly not a long-term solution for the team, but he was the right fit for the moment and came at a pretty modest cost. Lee immediately became the middle-of-the-order force that the Brewers needed to make the transition from the Geoff Jenkins and Lyle Overbay era to the young guns who would be called up over the next few years. If Melvin hadn’t botched the trade sending him out of town (more on that in the next piece), perhaps they could have leveraged his value into even more production after he was gone.

6) Signing Norichika Aoki.

Nori Aoki may be the only good thing that came from Ryan Braun’s positive test during the 2011 postseason, and it seems to have been mostly by accident.  The Brewers didn’t scout Aoki before making the winning 2.5 million dollar bid for him that December, and had to bring him in for a workout only afterwards. We’ll never know just how much Braun’s impending possible suspension played into the team eventually signing him to a two year contract or if they even would have made the move if that wasn’t a possibility. Regardless of how it happened, though, it’s been a fantastic success for Melvin. In fewer than 200 big league games, Aoki has already accrued 3.8 Fangraphs WAR for the Brewers and at a total cost of under 5 million in salary plus the posting bid. The Brewers also have a 1.5 million dollar option for next year and three years of arbitration control following that.

5) Signing Doug Davis.

Yes, younger fans, there was a time that Doug Davis was a fantastic value pickup for the Brewers. Davis pitched some and with little success for the Melvin-era Rangers and briefly for the Blue Jays before being released and eventually signed by the Brewers in July of 2003. He quickly became a stalwart for the rotation and would provide the team 10 Fangraphs WAR from 2004 to 2006. He cost the team just a bit over six million dollars in that time, which may make him the best dollar for dollar bargain on this list.

4)  Trading away Zack Greinke.

Yes, there is a lot of future projection since Segura has not even played a full major league season at this point. Maybe it’s tempting fate to put it this high on the list already, but this has all the earmarks of a all-time steal of a trade. It’s made all the more remarkable due to the fact that it’s gotten consistently harder and harder over the years to get back good prospects when trading away short periods of control of a player. That fact didn’t stop Melvin from being able to leverage the Angels’ want to get Greinke (and keep him away from the rival Texas Rangers) into Segura plus pitchers Johnny Hellweg and Ariel Pena, though. This has the potential to be a defining moment for the next half dozen years of Brewers history, maybe longer if the Brewers can extend him and turn him into a cornerstone for years to come.

3) Trading away Richie Sexson.

On December 1st, 2003, the Milwaukee Brewers made a key move when they traded Richie Sexson and a couple of spare parts for a package that included Chris Capuano, Lyle Overbay, Craig Counsell, Junior Spivey, Chad Moeller and Jorge De La Rosa. It’s hard to imagine a player with only one year remaining before free agency like Sexson getting back that sort of package now, but at the time the lack of established big leaguers and the fact that the Brewers were shedding payroll drew cries of  ”here we go again” from many fans. What Melvin got was two future mid-rotation starters in Capuano and De La Rosa, a solid starting first basemen in Overbay who could later be flipped, a couple of solid placeholder middle infielders to tide the Brewers over until their own prospects were ready and a backup catcher who liked the Grateful Dead. That may not have impressed people at the time, but it was excellent asset management on Melvin’s part and would pay dividends for years to come.

2) Extending Ryan Braun’s contact the first time.

When Melvin and owner Mark Attanasio gave Ryan Braun an eight year, 45 million dollar contract in May of 2008, it was the largest contract in baseball history for a player with less than a full year of big league service time. Braun was coming off a rookie-of-the-year season, but was still more than nearly six years away from free agency and so the deal made sense for both sides and was widely praised. It’s hard to imagine the deal working out much better than it has. Braun has racked up 30.0 Fangrpahs WAR since the start of the 2008 season, and the current deal doesn’t expire until after the 2015 season. If not for this deal, Braun would have been eligible for free agency after the current season. Instead, the Brewers were able to buy out 2014 and 2015 for an average of 11 million a year. On the open market, he easily would have fetched more than double that, and for a considerably longer length of time.

1) Not firing Jack Zduriencik.

It may seem strange to list a move not made as the best move of a tenure running a team, but here it is and it’s really hard to see a way that it doesn’t rank #1 on the list. Jack Z was originally hired to run the Brewers’ drafts by former GM Dean Taylor, and, starting with his very first draft in 2000, he would draft a future all star in each of the next six drafts. Corey Hart, JJ Hardy, Prince Fielder, Rickie Weeks, Yovani Gallardo, and Ryan Braun would go on to form the backbone of two playoff teams, but it definitely didn’t have to happen that way. Many GM’s fire their scouting director to bring in their own guy, but Melvin saw what Zduriencik was doing, recognized a good thing when he saw one and kept him around.  Beyond those guys, he also drafted Jonathan Lucroy and some key trade pieces in Matt LaPorta, Michael Brantley, Brett Lawrie, Jake Odorizzi.  Jack also missed some, and notably failed to draft much impact pitching. On the other hand, he gave Melvin so much cheap, controllable talent that Melvin should have been able to trade for and sign enough pitching to get by. The fact that Melvin failed so often to do that shouldn’t diminish the decision to keep Jack around.

Just missed the list: extending Jonathan Lucroy’s contract, signing Aramis Ramirez, extending Yovani Gallardo’s contract, extending Carlos Gomez’s contract.

Nashville Sounds: (12-32), 11.0 GB

RHP Tyler Thornburg:  (L, 0-6) 5.1 IP, 7 H, 5 ER, 1 BB, 8 K — 6.99 ERA
LHP Travis Webb:  1.0 IP, 0 H, 0 ER, 0 BB, 3 K — 4.34 ERA
RHP Michael Olmsted:  1.0 IP, 2 H, 0 ER, 0 BB, 0 K — 6.64 ERA

1B Blake Lalli:  1-4, 2B, 2 RBI, R, K — .258 AVG
3B Stephen Parker:  2-4, RBI — .248 AVG
2B Scooter Gennett:  2-5, SB (7), R, 2 K — .319 AVG

Huntsville Stars: (20-25), 8.0 GB

Did not play.

Brevard County Manatees: (25-20), 2.0 GB

LHP Brent Suter:  (W, 3-2) 6.0 IP, 5 H, 1 ER, 3 BB, 6 K — 3.23 ERA
RHP Kevin Shackelford:  (H, 4) 1.1 IP, 1 H, 0 ER, 1 BB, 2 K — 6.43 ERA
RHP Tommy Toledo:  (S, 4) 1.0 IP, 0 H, 0 ER, 1 BB, 0 K — 2.00 ERA

RF T.J. Mittelstaedt:  2-4, HR (3), 2 RBI, R — .241 AVG
DH Cody Hawn:  1-4, HR (7), 2 RBI, R — .262 AVG
C Cameron Garfield:  1-4, 2B — .247 AVG

Wisconsin Timber Rattlers: (20-21) 8.5 GB

RHP Austin Blaski:  6.0 IP, 5 H, 2 ER, 1 BB, 4 K, 1 HR — 1.95 ERA
LHP Taylor Wall:  (BS, 1) 1.0 IP, 2 H, 1 ER, 0 BB, 1 K — 2.40 ERA
RHP Jonathan Armold:  (W, 1-0) 2.0 IP, 2 H, 0 ER, 1 BB, 1 K — 0.00 ERA

RF Michael Reed:  3-6, 3 3B, RBI, R, K — .311 AVG
C Clint Coulter:  2-6, HR (3), 3 RBI, 3 R, K — .192 AVG
DH Tyrone Taylor:  1-1, 2B, 2 RBI, BB, SB (10), R — .245 AVG

Prospect of the Day:  OF Michael Reed (Class-A Wisconsin)

The Brewers drafted Michael Reed in the fifth round of the 2011 MLB Draft. They managed to sway him away from the University of Mississippi by signing him for $500,000 — which was more than three times the slot recommendation. The organization liked his power potential, his speed and his raw defensive tools.

On Wednesday evening, Reed put on a show for the Timber Rattlers. He collected three triples on the day and raised his overall slash line to .311/.383/.447 with eight doubles and five triples. Unfortunately, the home run power still hasn’t shown itself throughout his entire professional career, as he has only one home run in roughly 400 at-bats. That’s a bit concerning because during the ’11 Draft, some scouts wondered if he was physically maxed out in high school and wouldn’t develop much as a professional. Overall, though, he’s having a very nice season thus far and should now play everyday along side Taylor and Roache in the outfield with Mitch Haniger getting promoted to Brevard County.

The last thing this team needs is an injured Kyle Lohse, but the Brewers announced this afternoon that Lohse will miss his next start with irritation and tightness in his elbow. Right-hander Mike Fiers will receive the spot start. Fiers hasn’t allowed a run in his last three appearances out of the bullpen, giving him 4.1 consecutive scoreless innings.

Ron Roenicke downplayed the injury prior to the game:

“He could go out and pitch,” Roenicke said. “But because he didn’t have a Spring Training, we would rather try to get rid of this, so we’re going to bump him a start.”

Elbow injuries are nothing to treat lightly, though. A little irritation is almost always an indicator of something more serious, so while it will obviously be a storyline to watch until Lohse returns to the rotation, it’s something that fans should diligently follow for the next couple months. On the more optimistic side, Lohse has experienced discomfort for the past two or three starts and his velocity hasn’t suffered — which could mean the irritation/tightness/discomfort really is minimal.

For now, the injury means Hiram Burgos will remain in the rotation for at least one additional start. Fiers could eventually replace him — especially if Burgos struggles against the Twins next week — but Fiers is the only potential replacement on the horizon. Tyler Thornburg and Johnny Hellweg are not ready to make the jump to the big-league rotation, and lefty Chris Narveson remains on the disabled list with a finger injury.

The Brewers have had maddening issues in the starting rotation, and the Lohse injury stings like salt in a large wound. If the worst-case scenario happens and Lohse is forced to miss an extended period of time with an elbow injury, the Brewers could find themselves in a really bad spot this summer. They could anyway, considering the team now sits nine games under .500 with a -36 run differential, but removing one of the key cogs in an already-disappointing rotation could spell disaster for the club.

It’s not necessarily time to press the panic button. Owner Mark Attanasio visited the Brewers’ broadcast booth on Wednesday afternoon and reminded everyone the team had an identical record at this time last year and still made a serious run at the second Wild Card spot. The Brewers have almost three-fourths of the season remaining to right the ship. Still, coming into Wednesday’s finale against the Dodgers, the team had a 3.1% chance to reach the postseason (according to Baseball Prospectus), and that razor-thin margin seems even smaller if Kyle Lohse is removed from the starting rotation for an extended period of time.

Thus, I wanted to write an update on some of the Brewers’ top prospects, including some insight from people in (or connected to) the industry.

Orlando Arcia, SS, Class-A Wisconsin

If you’re not already on the Orlando Arcia bandwagon, be sure to climb aboard and strap in while space is still available. One contact said he’s the first and last guy scouts want to talk about when discussing the Brewers’ system. The 18-year-old shortstop may only own a .246/.322/.308 slash line on the season, but he’s caught fire as of late — hitting .340/.435/.415 in the month of May. He projects to stick at shortstop all the way up the ladder and has an advanced approach at the plate.

Just think: he’s 18 years old, playing his first professional season stateside in the difficult Midwest League, and he’s still holding his own? And not only holding his own, but OPS-ing .850+ in May? This guy is the real deal. Next year, we could be talking about Arcia as the Brewers’ number-one prospect, and Jason Parks of Baseball Prospectus opines he will be a top 101 prospect in all of baseball.

Tyler Thornburg, RHP, Triple-A Nashville

The first two months of the season can be labelled as nothing other than a disappointment for Thornburg. The Brewers’ starting rotation currently ranks last in the National League with a 5.17 ERA, and Thornburg remains in Triple-A Nashville with a lofty 6.80 ERA.

Nobody seems to know where to place the right-hander — starter or reliever. One contact even said he thought the Brewers were conflicted as to Thornburg’s ultimate role. The 24-year-old hurler has struggled with his fastball command this year, leaving it up in the zone quite often. And without much natural angle to the plate because of his short stature, he has to work down in the strike zone with his fastball to be effective. Otherwise, it gets very straight and hittable — which Brewers fans saw last year in his brief promotion to the majors.

Still, Mark Anderson of Baseball Prospect Nation told me: ”I still believe Thornburg can start at the big league level, he just may need a large chunk of this year to continue refining his game.”

Clint Coulter, C, Class-A Wisconsin

The raw numbers haven’t been pretty for the Brewers’ first-round draft pick in last year’s draft. He’s only hitting .184/.281/.306 with two home runs. Despite that, though, scouts continue to be very encouraged about his ability at the plate. The power potential remains, and he’s shown an ability to drive high-end velocity.

Defensively, it’s been a work in progress. I haven’t talked to anyone who believes Coulter will be able to stick as a catcher at the major-league level. In fact, multiple contacts expressed concern over the Brewers’ keeping him at catcher. The physical and emotional stress catchers experience during development is extraordinary — especially catchers who are spending extra time developing the defensive tools — and multiple contacts wondered if his development would be better served moving him away from catcher now and just let his bat play.

Victor Roache, OF, Class-A Wisconsin

Roache fell to the Brewers with the 28th pick of the 2013 Draft because he severely injured his wrist in his final collegiate season. Because of that injury, the Brewers got a premium talent late in the first round. They got a potential middle-of-the-order bat with plus raw power that will play in either right or left field, and that raw power could eventually develop into 30+ homers in the majors.

The question is whether Roache will be able to hit enough to allow the power to play. He’s shown both power and patience this year, but scouts continue to question his ability to handle quality breaking stuff. His pitch recognition isn’t well-developed at this point. The organization hopes he can become at least a .250 hitter with plenty of walks and homers — which is plenty valuable — but strikeouts will likely remain an issue throughout his professional career.

Jimmy Nelson, RHP, Double-A Huntsville

Many pitchers in the Brewers’ organization have scuffled this spring, but Nelson has moved into the spotlight because he’s one of the top-tier guys who has taken a step forward. He owns a 3.04 ERA in 47.1 innings and the peripherals have been impressive — 9.1 K/9 and 2.1 BB/9.

Although he’s a personal favorite and has performed very well in 2013, one contact cautioned fans to lower their expectations for Nelson. He profiles as a workhorse mid-rotation starter. Nothing more. His third-or-fourth starter grade may be disappointing to some, but his floor appears to be high. Everyone I spoke with said he’s a big leaguer. And for an organization that has struggled to develop starting pitching, that’s encouraging.

Johnny Hellweg, RHP, Triple-A Nashville

Hellweg is interesting because he’s 24 years old and in Triple-A, yet he’s largely considered a project who is still learning how to pitch. The numbers aren’t pretty. He currently has a 4.33 ERA with 33 strikeouts and 33 walks in 43.2 innings. At the same time, he’s reportedly hit triple-digits on the radar gun and goes through stretches where he’s utterly dominant on the mound.

Two separate contacts said they believe he has a chance to stick as a starter, but neither was willing to commit to that stance. At 6-foot-9, his mechanics are very difficult to repeat. His levers are extremely long and can get out of sync in a hurry. This is best exemplified by his May 5th start against Round Rock. He was throwing a no-hitter through three innings and had popped 100 mph. Then, suddenly, Hellweg lost it and walked four hitters in the fourth and couldn’t recover. He was lifted after 3.2 innings, and his final line marred his early performance.

It sounds like Hellweg will probably land in the back-end of the Brewers bullpen in the coming years, possibly as a shutdown closer. Still, he shows flashes of “getting it” as a starter, and I expect the organization to nurture that possibility as much as possible before transitioning him to a bullpen role.

Mitch Haniger, OF, Class-A Wisconsin

Haniger needs to go to Brevard County. He’s currently hitting .295/.401/.511 with 11 doubles, two triples and five home runs. He even has seven stolen bases and hasn’t been caught once. The 22-year-old outfielder needs a bigger challenge than the Midwest League, though the Brewers could be keeping Haniger with the Timber Rattlers in an attempt to keep him with the next group of hitters — much like the Brewers did with the Huntsville Stars in 2008.

Tyrone Taylor, OF, Class-A Wisconsin

When the Brewers drafted Taylor in the second round last year, he was considered an athlete first and a baseball player second. He made some adjustments to his swing last summer, though, and tore through the Arizona League and Pioneer League before succumbing to a shoulder injury.

This year, he’s holding his own in the Midwest League as a 19-year-old outfielder. He’s hitting .240/.275/.370, but he’s driving the baseball with some power and is continuing to hone his baseball skills. He projects well up the middle and should stick as a center fielder. The key is whether he’ll hit enough for it to matter. The early results have been very positive for Tyrone Taylor.

Taylor Jungmann, RHP, Double-A Huntsville

Jungmann was supposed to be a can’t-miss guy coming out of the University of Texas. He was someone who could advance quickly through the Brewers’ system and make an impact at the major-league level. Heck, some draft experts even wondered if the Brewers would move Jungmann to the bullpen to help them in the 2011 postseason race.

Unfortunately, it hasn’t happened that way. He owns a 5.09 ERA in Double-A and only has 20 strikeouts in 40.2 innings. Multiple contacts expressed concern over his inability to miss bats, and nobody has been wowed by his offspeed offerings. He’s been sitting 92-93 mph with the fastball for Double-A Huntsville and has the ability to reach back for more. At this point, though, it seems Jungmann profiles more like a back-end starter (4/5) with one contact wondering if he’s even a big league arm at all.

He’s been working on a new grip on his curveball since last season, so perhaps that’s a reason why his strikeout numbers are so depressed. Eventually, though, he’s going to have to show something. It hasn’t been anything to write home about thus far.

Jorge Lopez, RHP, Class-A Wisconsin

I asked a couple contacts to give me an off-the-radar guy who they liked in the Brewers system. Both mentioned right-hander Jorge Lopez. He’s still sitting in the low-90s with his fastball and can touch 95-96 mph. He also has good feel for his curveball and changeup. The problem is an extreme lack of consistency, which is why he has an 11.64 ERA. Still, he’s striking out almost a batter per inning and still has loads of projectability at only 20 years old.

He may never develop into anything. He may never even reach Double-A. But the right-hander has encouraging raw tools. The numbers just show how raw those tools are right now.

The basic trend continued last night, as the Brewers lost Gallardo’s fourth consecutive start, which was also his second consecutive quality start. In fact, for all the clamoring about Gallardo’s stuff, the righty pitched well since his whipping in St. Louis, hurling five quality starts in his last seven (alongside a 34 K / 18 BB / 4 HR performance in 41.7 IP. When Gallardo has encountered rough stretches over the last month, he has largely limited the damage). If you’re scoffing at the idea of five quality starts in seven starts, or a 3.88 runs average, that’s markedly better than the Miller Park/NL runs average of 4.34; over a full season, that mark is 10 runs better than the league, which is a top rotation performance marker.

I’ve written about this before, so I don’t want to produce a repetitive beat, but when most fans, analysts, and writers mention Gallardo’s fastball velocity, they don’t place that velocity in the context of his other pitches. While our own Ryan and Steve have noted in their “Rounding the Bases” column that Gallardo’s mechanics have become inconsistent over time, those mechanical inconsistencies (and subsequent fastball velocity shifts) have accompanied (a) increased slider selection, (b) increased slider velocity, (c) near-elimination of the change up, and (d) lower curveball velocity. If you follow FanGraphs’s division between “four-seam” and “two-seam” fastballs (or, “primary” and “secondary,” “rising” and “moving” fastballs), Gallardo is notably throwing more of the “secondary” variety this year, compared to previous seasons.

I had the privilege of watching the Brewers’ FOX Game of the Week against St. Louis at the beginning of May, and I noticed something peculiar about Gallardo’s approach. It’s not so much that his fastball lost velocity, or that he was mechanically inconsistent, but that he appeared to be approaching his fastball in a completely different way.

Some of his fastballs were nearly indistinguishable from his hardest sliders, which almost act as cutters (over the last three years, according the TexasLeaguers, an average RHP cutter will run anywhere between 1 MPH and 3 MPH slower than a “primary” fastball). Some of his fastballs almost appeared to “fade” like a change up, or run in against righties. It’s not as though he was throwing a true sinker (like, say, Justin Masterson or Doug Fister, but simply that his fastball wasn’t “straight,” it wasn’t a typical, hard primary fastball (like someone such as Ben Sheets would throw). Since his fastball and slider were so close in velocity, it appeared that Gallardo’s approach focused on movement and location, rather than disrupting a batter’s timing.

Gallardo's spin/movement chart for May 2012...

...Gallardo's spin/movement chart in May 2013

If you follow TexasLeaguers’ (or FanGraphs’) horizontal and vertical movement measurements of Gallardo’s fastballs, the trends in his fastballs show that his primary fastball indeed breaks in on righties more than in previous years. Furthermore, his primary fastball does not “rise” as much. Since pitch f/x measures pitches against a spinless ball of the same speed, the tool can measure not only how a pitch “drops,” but also how a pitcher employs spin to keep a pitch from dropping as much as one might expect (of course we all know that pitches don’t ACTUALLY rise; but, for all intents and purposes, a “rising fastball” effectively challenges a batter’s eyes by not dropping as much as one might expect. Spin can accomplish this effect, if a pitcher uses it that way).

In short, Gallardo is not necessarily throwing a sinker (in fact, I’ve not read one report that says he throws a sinker. Save for an April 26, 2009 article on the Houston Astros’ site). However, he is either (1) approaching his fastballs differently, or (2) suffering from mechanical inefficiencies that cause his fastballs to move differently, or both. Frankly, given Gallardo’s success over the last seven starts, I have a hard time believing that Gallardo’s fastballs are changing due to basic inefficiencies or mechanical inconsistently. The manner in which he employs his fastball and slider suggest that he might be trying to do something different with the pitches.

The next time you hear about Gallardo’s fastball velocity from someone, pay attention to how he’s using his slider and fastballs in tandem, and also pay attention to the speed of his slider. A dip in fastball velocity is not necessarily a bad thing if Gallardo is executing his approach and simply trying to move his fastballs a specific way. Furthermore, if Gallardo effectively uses his hard slider, the increase in his slider velocity could be much more important than the dip in his fastball velocity.

The potential problem is that Gallardo does not have much velocity separation between his main pitches (for instance, more than 75% of Gallardo’s pitches in May are between 86 and 90 MPH, on average). However, even if we think about Warren Spahn‘s great adage that pitching is disrupting a batter’s timing, we can also think about pitching as a chance to “move” or “break” the ball in specific directions and locations. If Gallardo is doing this with his fastballs and slider, his drop in velocity might not be the most important or interesting development in his 2013 campaign.

RESOURCES:
Baseball-Reference. Sports Reference, LLC., 2000-2013.
TexasLeaguers. Trip Somers, 2009-2013.

Other articles or resources linked where cited.

IMAGES:
Gallardo: http://lasordaslair.com/2013/05/20/just-like-old-times-ethier-and-kemp-homer-while-kershaw-shuts-down-brewers/
Spin charts from TexasLeaguers. Trip Somers, 2009-2013.

What follows in an excerpt from the first edition of the Brewsletter, a Milwaukee Brewers newsletter that takes  a deeper look into Brewers topics of the present and past. To buy the 19-page Brewsletter No. 1 click this button.

* * *

Russ Bove spent 11 years scouting for the Milwaukee Brewers. He arrived in 1993, the first of 12 consecutive losing seasons for the Brewers. With high draft picks year-in and year-out it was up to scouts like Bove to make sure something came of them.

But, as 12 years of losing suggests, there were busts aplenty. According to Baseball America, these were Milwaukee’s top prospects of the 1990s:

1990 Greg Vaughn, of
1991 Chris George, rhp
1992 Tyrone Hill, lhp
1993 Tyrone Hill, lhp
1994 Jeff D’Amico, rhp
1995 Antone Williamson, 3b
1996 Jeff D’Amico, rhp
1997 Todd Dunn, of
1998 Valerio De Los Santos, lhp
1999 Ron Belliard, 2b

Tyrone Hill was a pre-Bove selection, a left-handed hurler the Brewers popped with the 15th pick of the 1991 draft. Hill was promising early on, but injuries stopped his career before it could get started. He never progressed past High-A. Jeff D’Amico was similarly injury riddled. He was excellent in 2000, but injuries in subsequent seasons left him a fifth starter at best.

Antone Williamson played 24 major league games. Todd Dunn played 50. Only Ron Belliard didn’t bust – he was an average big leaguer for five years as a Brewer – but his presence atop Milwaukee’s prospect list effectively sums up the situation down on the farm in the millennium’s final year.

Milwaukee had the 10th pick in the 1999 draft – the Brewers of the late 90s were merely bad, not atrocious like the clubs of the early 2000s. The 1998 squad finished at a gentleman’s 74-88. Without much at the farm’s top levels, the Brewers desperately needed to hit at 10.

On April 10th, 1999, Russ Bove headed down to Louisiana to scout a right-handed starting pitcher. From his report:

“Solid, thick body. Powerful lower half. Good athlete. Fastball ranges from 91-93 MPH with heavy boring life. Throws easy. Quick arm. Command of sharp, downer curveball. Good motion on changeup. Keeps ball down. Command of all three pitches. Focused. Good fielder. Outstanding mound presence.”

And the coup de grace:

“No brainer if available at No. 10.”

When Bove wrote “No brainer if available at No. 10,” one has to imagine he didn’t think Sheets would be there. Would the other nine teams in front of the Brewers pass on such an obvious talent? Bove rated all of Sheets’s pitches as average or better already in 1999, with room to grow into ace-level stuff.

Sheets wasn’t going to supplant Josh Hamilton, the consensus No. 1 for the Devil Rays. He wasn’t going to supplant Josh Beckett, the obvious No. 2 pick for the Marlins. Then Sheets lasted through the top-five. Eric Munson, No. 3, played 361 games under replacement-level for Detroit. Corey Myers and B.J. Garbe, a pair of high school position players, never made the majors.

The next four clubs all took pitchers. The Expos picked Josh Girdley; he never reached the majors. Kyle Snyder, the Royals’ pick, threw 93 games of irrelevant relief. Bobby Bradley, the Pirates’ selection, never reached the majors. Finally, the Athletics popped Barry Zito right in front of the Brewers. Although Zito went on to win a Cy Young with Oakland, Bove must have been ecstatic—after all, Bove labeled the lefty a third starter, worthy of an early draft pick, but not on the level of Sheets. And so the Brewers popped Bove’s man at No. 10

Ben Sheets was indisputably the most important Brewer of the early 2000s. He was the only pitcher drafted in the 1990s to last in Milwaukee through the club’s Wild Card run in 2008. (Bill Hall was the only position player, and his career in Milwaukee defined flash in the pan.)

Certainly, the dearth of talent on those early-2000s Brewers amplified his rise to stardom. Milwaukee was aching for any ray of hope. Geoff Jenkins, a solid player but not the impact player hoped for as the number nine overall pick in 1995, plateaued as a hacker without the power to differentiate himself from other steroid era sluggers.Jeromy Burnitz was already 31 years old by 2000. The club had no short-term or long-term solutions in the middle infield. The rotation was even worse – Jeff D’Amico was the only Brewer to post an ERA better than the league average in 1999 or 2000, and we all know how that turned out.

No, Sheets was not going to turn the 2001 Milwaukee Brewers, a team that handed a combined 96 starts to Jamey Wright, Jimmy Haynes and Allen Levrault, into a contender immediately, or even within a year or two. But the 2001 Milwaukee Brewers handed Jamey Wright, Jimmy Haynes and Allen Levrault 96 starts, and in that sense, Sheets inspired the highest of hopes.

He won Milwaukee’s heart with his first half in 2001. He was demoted after two poor starts to begin the season, and once he returned on April 28th, he dominated. From his return start through the All-Star break, Sheets posted a 3.26 ERA—practically Gibsonian in 2001 as the steroid era wreaked havoc on pitcher statistics across the league. Sheets was the first Brewers rookie to make an All-Star team. The Brewers didn’t give Milwaukee much to watch in 2001, their first year in Miller Park, but at least they had Big Ben.

And so it went for about a half-decade, until Jack Zduriencik’s hitters showed up and powered the 2008 Wild Card club. Sheets arrived on the national scene in 2004, when he posted a 2.70 ERA and absurd league-leading 8.25 K/BB over 237 innings for a 67-win club. The 2004 Brewers were the special type of team that could turn this type of performance—the kind we could see winning a Cy Young thanks to Zack Greinke and Felix Hernandez in recent years—into a 12-14 season. But this was before mainstream acceptance of win-loss record as a lesser stat, and so Sheets finished just eighth in Cy Young voting.

Sheets could have been a superstar. Would have been a superstar, even, had his body held up.  In 2005, it was vestibular neuritis—effectively persistent vertigo—and a lat strain. In 2006, it was a right shoulder strain that turned into shoulder inflammation. In 2007, it was a middle finger sprain. And in 2008, just as he finished one of his best seasons and helped CC Sabathia carry Milwaukee to their first postseason in 26 years, it was the elbow. Tommy John surgery ended his Brewers career and all but ended his major-league career.

But Sheets should be remembered as more than just what could have been. He was the light at the end of the tunnel. In 2004, as he piled up the strikeouts and consistently dominated National League hitting, Prince Fielder, Rickie Weeks, Yovani Gallardo and Corey Hart were shooting through the minor leagues. Ryan Braun was the club’s first round pick in 2005. The foundation for a competitive team was starting to form, and Ben Sheets was the most visible piece.

Ben Sheets never appeared in a playoff game in a Milwaukee Brewers jersey. It’s one of the biggest shames in the franchise’s history. He gave us a reason to watch as we slogged through the remnants of Bud Selig’s final years of incompetent ownership, and then he led the way in 2008, the year baseball was given new life in Milwaukee. That’s why it’s so fun to go back through the archives and find Russ Bove calling Ben Sheets a no-brainer. He was exactly that for the Brewers, and in return he helped make baseball relevant again in Wisconsin.

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